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ment in our Lord's consciousness on earth ; but that this may not have been immediate in all relations, but centering in and radiating out from his consciousness of God.

WALTER F. ADENEY.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

SOME ASPECTS OF PAUL'S THEOLOGY IN THE
PHILIPPIAN EPISTLE.

I.

THE Philippian letter, as is well known, is not of a distinctively doctrinal character. It is a familiar epistle, called out by the generous gift of the Philippian church to Paul, in which to his acknowledgment of their bounty the apostle adds such practical counsels as his acquaintance with their circumstances suggests. It is informal and irregular in structure, so much so as to have provoked the challenge of its integrity. It passes rapidly and abruptly from one topic to another, and, like the second Corinthian letter, is characterized throughout by strong emotion.

Nevertheless, it holds a good deal of theology in solution. It deals with doctrinal points, not in the way of exposition, like the letter to the Romans, but in the way of allusion to principles and facts which are assumed to be familiar to the readers and accepted by them. Such hints as are furnished by the Thessalonian and Philippian epistles indicate that the type of Christianity in the Macedonian churches was exceptionally fine and robust. In Macedonia the apostle's teaching was little disturbed by foreign elements. There are, indeed, evidences of the unsettled conditions of a new spiritual life — the gradual rooting of new principles and the tendency to partisanship ; and Paul's exhortations are addressed to the common inclinations which develop under such conditions—boasting, self-love, ambition, and petty jealousy ; but of conflicts between opposing tendencies of thought and faith there is no evidence, either as respects Jewish or heathen inclinations. The national traits of the Macedonians were revealed in their Christian life. Without the intellectual vivacity and subtlety which, in other places, opened the way for the inroads of speculative gnosis ; without the restlessness of the Hellenic mind which found vent in the discussion of Christian problems—that active, practical, buoyant character which made the power of Greece felt throughout the world, the courage, tenacity, and power of endurance developed a type of Chris-

tianity, simple in faith, generous in impulse, open-handed, fruitful in good works, and steadfast under persecution.

In the present paper I desire to offer some observations upon the Pauline theology as it appears in two passages of this letter: the celebrated christological passage in the second chapter, and that portion of the third chapter in which the apostle sets forth the nature of the righteousness of faith.

Much of the difficulty which attaches to the former passage is due to its interpreters rather than to the passage itself, and arises from the assumption that in these verses Paul was attempting to formulate a statement of the character and conditions of Christ's existence before and during his incarnation. Such a view is utterly inconsistent with the familiar tone of the letter and with the practical intent of the passage, the principal object of which is to enforce the duty of humility. As the supreme illustration of this virtue, Paul adduces the example of Jesus Christ in his voluntary renunciation of his pre-incarnate majesty and his voluntary identification with our humanity. The points of the illustration are thrown out in rapid succession and without elaboration, and are all brought to bear upon the exhortation: "Look not everyone at his own things, but everyone also on the things of others." Paul does, indeed, rise here above the level of epistolary colloquialism, but the impulse to the higher flight is emotional and not philosophic.

Bishop Lightfoot does not escape this error in his well-known excursus on the synonyms *σχῆμα* and *μορφή* (*Commentary on Philippians*, 12th ed., p. 127). Before the philosophical period the predominant sense of *μορφή* was "shape" or "figure," a sense which is retained to some extent in philosophical usage, and which occurs in both Plato and Aristotle. These two philosophers, however, employed the term with a wider range of meaning, applying it to immaterial facts; and it is from Aristotle's usage especially that Lightfoot draws the meaning of "specific character" which he attributes to Paul's use of the word here. It may be granted that Aristotle employs it in this sense; but a far more thorough discussion of Aristotle's usage than is furnished by the excursus would be necessary in order to make good that position, if it can be made good. There are three things to be said: (1) that Aristotle, as already remarked, uses the word also in the earlier, objective sense; (2) that his more subjective conception of *μορφή* is not uniform throughout, being more purely intellectual in his *Logic* than in his *Physics*; (3) that even in his most subtle and immaterial concep-

tion of "form" the abstract is habitually brought into concrete realization. His doctrine is familiar to all students, that sensible objects consist of matter and form; matter being simply the potentiality of becoming, while form makes this potentiality actual, so that matter is not intelligible without form, though the form is not necessarily external or material.

I find it impossible to believe that Paul's use of *μορφή* was derived from Aristotle, or was intended by him to denote "specific character," in the sense asserted by Lightfoot. The starting-point of his conception lay, in my judgment, nearer to the anthropomorphic than to the metaphysical; not necessarily that he definitely conceived God as invested with human form, but that he conceived the essential personality of God as externalizing itself and expressing itself in some mode apprehensible to pure spiritual intelligences, if not to the human mind. But it seems likely, in any case, that Paul's mind touched the conception of "the form of God" very slightly and incidentally, and only on its outskirts, since the application of the word *μορφή* to God was mainly a reflection of its application to "a bond servant." Christ's humiliation was the dominant idea in Paul's mind, and the *μορφή* of a bond servant, therefore, came first in the order of thought. The idea of some embodiment of the divine personality was not altogether absent from his mind; but it is quite possible that it did not assume conscious definition, and was chiefly a rhetorical antithesis to *μορφή δούλου*.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that Paul uses the word with a recognition of its peculiar relation to the essential and permanent nature of that which is expressed or manifested; so that it is purposely chosen instead of *σχῆμα*, which signifies merely the outward and transient configuration without regard to that which is behind it. In illustrating this distinction, Lightfoot, in one or two instances, seems to me to have refined too much, as in his illustration from Mark 16:12, and his explanation of *μόρφωσις*, Rom. 2:20, as signifying an *aiming* after or *affecting* the real *μορφή* of knowledge and truth. This will hardly hold.

I assume that in vs. 6 Paul refers to the pre-incarnate condition of our Lord, and in vss. 7, 8 to his incarnate state. With this seems to go necessarily the continuity of Jesus' divine consciousness in his human condition, that is, that he did not forget or lose sight of his original equality with God. This might easily open the whole vexed question of the kenosis, which I should have no room to discuss here, even if I were so disposed. The fact that Jesus retained the consciousness of

his original divine prerogative seems to me to be as clearly indicated as any christological fact in the New Testament.

That it is distinctly asserted in the fourth gospel is admitted. Such passages as John 8 : 58; 13 : 3; 17 : 5, 24, not to speak of the prologue, are unquestionable. He comes from the Father with a special commission. His union with the Father is clearly to be distinguished from that which any good man may have with God. In virtue of this union he possesses peculiar powers. Even the tremendous prerogative of judging the world is claimed by him, to the end that men should honor him as they honor the Father. He does not make many or full disclosures of the unseen world, but what he does say is said with a tone of special authority and as by one who is speaking of his native home.

But such indications are by no means confined to the fourth gospel. They are found in abundance in the synoptic gospels. He is *the* Son of God whom no one knows save the Father, and who only, with those to whom he chooses to manifest him, knows the Father. Even the title "the Son of Man" implies his peculiar and representative relation to humanity, and that he bears the nature of man in an exceptional way. He is the fulfiller of the law and the prophets, the founder of the kingdom of God, its supreme legislator and head. He offers rest to the world, and the offer is based on the delivery of all things to him by the Father. He forgives sins with divine authority. He assumes authority over Satan and the demons. Men must confess him, and the awards of the final judgment are to be regulated by their relation to him. He is to come to judge the world, sitting upon the clouds, upon the throne of glory, at the right hand of power. Under all these utterances lies the distinct consciousness of a unique relation to God. That any being should say such things and prefer such claims without this consciousness is incredible, except upon the supposition that he was either the greatest of dupes or the greatest of impostors.

The same consciousness, unbroken by his entrance into the human state, is clearly implied in the epistle to the Hebrews. Nowhere is his condition of humiliation more distinctly stated, and nowhere is his preëxistent condition of divine majesty and equality with God more emphatically asserted. In the state of humiliation he is carrying out the restoration of the divine archetype conceived before the ages in the mind of God. Is it credible that the consciousness of these two states should be severed? Is it credible that the writer should conceive him in the work of his priesthood and sacrifice and purging away of sins as

not reverting to his own original share in the very design which he had come to earth in order to carry out, as having lost or sunk for the time all sense of the ages when, as the very image of God's substance, he was working toward this very consummation and bearing onward all things by the word of his power?

But, it is said, this is not recognized by Paul. Not in the same way as in the gospels, for we have almost no utterances of Christ in the Pauline epistles; but it is none the less clearly implied. In this passage Christ is described as renouncing his pre-incarnate majesty by a voluntary, self-conscious act. Shall we believe that in that act Christ temporarily annihilated all consciousness of that which he renounced; that there was a breach of continuity in the mind which gave rise to the incarnation; that a mighty impulse of free and self-conscious love constrained the eternal Son to descend into humanity, and in the descent that love lost itself for years? (Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 227.) Is it likely that Paul, on this point, held a view so utterly at variance with that of the gospels? On this point the words of Weizsäcker are worth citing: "He had a personal existence before his human birth, and his earlier life was divine and absolutely opposed to the dependent life of man upon earth. Christ becomes man by a personal act. The heavenly descent of 'the man from heaven' is equivalent to the thought that he was 'in the form of God;' and Paul can, therefore, say without hesitation that it was Jesus the Christ who first existed in the divine form and then humbled himself. Had he not given his doctrine of Christ this backward extension, the human life of Christ would have become for him a sort of impersonal event, and Jesus a mere instrument. His doctrine of the preëxistence accordingly enables him to look upon Christ's work as a personal act, and to preserve the bond between him and humanity."

On the same line is 2 Cor. 8:9. Christ was rich, but voluntarily became poor that he might enrich men through his poverty. Are we to suppose that Paul regarded Christ in his state of poverty as oblivious of the riches out of which he came with the express purpose of making men sharers in them? Or take Col. 1:19, and the context. Here, too, the work of redemption through Christ's blood is put in direct connection with his pre-incarnate glory. His original divine dignity is emphasized in order to throw into stronger relief his value and power as a human redeemer. He stands between the eternal glory and the abject human condition as a mediator and reconciler. "For it pleased the Father that in him should all the fulness dwell; and having made

peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven." Throw out of this passage the idea of the continuity of consciousness, and it becomes practically pointless. A reconciler must have an eye on both sides. A mediator must have a hand on both parties. It is simply incredible that Paul should have conceived Christ as carrying on the work of reconciling God and man, things in heaven and things on earth, in a state of utter obliviousness or suspended consciousness of the fact that he was from the beginning the image of the invisible God, with all the divine fulness dwelling in him.

To the same effect are Paul's words in 1 Corinthians, chap. 15, concerning Christ as the agent in man's resurrection. The whole argument for our resurrection rests upon the fact that Christ as the *Lord from heaven* became partaker of death and rose from the dead. The pre-incarnate condition cannot be divorced from the work in the flesh. Did Paul assume such a divorce in Christ's thought?

And all these acquire the more force when we have once freed ourselves from the tendency to regard Christ's eternal glory and his humiliation as distinct. They stood in unbroken connection in Christ's consciousness because of their organic connection in fact. The two are parts of one whole. The humiliation is a phase of the glory. The outraying of the divine glory in Christ does not cease when he becomes man. Love, devotion, sacrifice, suffering for others are divine and eternal in their nature. They are outgoings and ongoings of the eternal quality of God. Hence the writer to the Hebrews is careful to say that "*it became*" even the God by whom and for the sake of whom all things are, to carry out his eternal plan of salvation through a suffering Savior (Heb. 2 : 10). Incarnation and humiliation were not a break in the history of humanity, nor in the eternal activity of God in Christ. The "Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world." Christ's humiliation, so far from obscuring his glory, was a new and unique revelation of it. It showed how the divine in man could be evolved out of that to which no thought of the divine attached—sorrow, suffering, poverty, ignominy, and death; and in its result the final achievement of redemption will identify itself with the original ideal of creation, and the divine glory will once more be reflected from the whole universe of God.

Passing now from this, we are met by the question whether ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων and τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ signify the same thing. "No,"

it is said. Equality with God did not inhere in Christ's pre-incarnate being. He received it first at his exaltation and as a reward for his perfect obedience. Thus Dorner (*Christl. Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II, pp. 286 f.) says: "His manhood is raised to a full share in the divine majesty as a reward of its maintaining true obedience. He could not have been exalted if he had not exhibited a faultless development in a true existence and obedience."

Along with this view goes an assumed antithesis between Christ and Adam. Dorner says: "While the first Adam grasped at equality with God, the second obtained exaltation to the divine majesty; since not only would he not assume the divine dignity, but, though himself elevated in dignity, humbled himself, and became obedient even unto death." The parallel is developed by Ernesti (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1848, Hft. 4): "Adam would be God; Christ renounced his god-likeness. Adam suffered death as a doom; Christ voluntarily. Adam incurred the divine curse; Christ won the approval of God, and the reward of exaltation to equality with God."

The same view is held by Dr. Briggs. He says: "It was, indeed, involved in his existing in the form of God that he should be equal in rank with God. From that point of view it might be said that he would not grasp after his own rank, to which he was entitled as the Son of God; but it is probable that the apostle had in mind the antithesis between the first and the second Adam which is so characteristic of his theology. He is thinking of the sinful grasping of the first Adam after equality with God under the instigation of the serpent. As the second Adam he will not grasp after equality with God, even though it be his birthright. He will receive it from the hands of God as a gift of love, after he has *earned* it by obedience, just as the first Adam ought to have done" (*Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 180. Similarly Beyschlag, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, 2. Aufl., Bd. II, p. 88).

Setting aside for the moment the question of the two Adams, I fail to see the consistency of Dr. Briggs' first statement—that equality in rank with God was involved in Christ's existence in the form of God—with his last statement, that equality with God was something which Christ *earned* by his obedience. This inconsistency is not reconciled by the antithesis of the two Adams. At any rate, these statements can mean only that the status of the pre-incarnate Christ was inferior to his status after his incarnation; that the being whom Paul describes as existing in the form of God was something less than the being whom God highly exalted. This is clearly put by Beyschlag: "The subject

of this passage is not Son of God, as in the so-called Athanasian symbol, but one sharply distinguished from God. The *μορφῇ θεοῦ* in which he preëxisted is not a *μορφῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and the *ἴσα θεῷ εἶναι* is not an *ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι*. There remains between him and the one God, who is the Father, so decided a difference that the incomparable glory which Christ won through his self-emptying and obedience unto death does not belong to him as his eternal, natural possession, but is given to him by God's free grace, and must redound only to the honor of the Father. Hence *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* cannot signify a laying aside of his divine being, but only the laying aside of his mode of manifestation" (*Neutestamentliche Theologie*, II, p. 86).

It is difficult to see how such words can be reconciled with passages like Col. 1:15-17, in which, to the doctrine of the form of God in the Philippian letter, we have added the doctrine that the preëxistent Son of God was the mediator between God and the creature in creation, in providence, and in redemption. Add to this John 1:1, 2; 5:21; 6:4, 18, and especially Heb. 1:2, 3. In this last passage we have a more technical and formal statement after the manner of the Alexandrian school, and according to this statement the preëxistent Christ was the very impress of God's substance.

Beyschlag, as Philo (*De Somn.*, I, 39, 41), insists on the distinction between *ὁ θεός* and *θεός*, claiming that this distinction is observed in John 1:1. But in that passage *θεός*, predicated of the Logos, is used attributively and with a notion of kind, and is thus necessarily anarthrous. It excludes identity of person, but emphasizes identity of essence and nature. Accordingly, what John says is that the Logos was with God, and that with no lower nature than God himself. Philo, on the contrary, claims that the anarthrous *θεός* describes the Logos as of subordinate nature—*δεύτερος θεός*.

Dorner cites Rom. 1:4 to show that Christ was constituted the Son of God *with power* only after his resurrection. "Therefore, before this, he was not the Son of God with power, though he was already the Son" (*Chr. Glaubensl.*, II, p. 284). But this inference rests on a misinterpretation. *Ἐν δυνάμει* does not belong with *υἱοῦ θεοῦ*, but is adverbial, and qualifies *ὁρισθέντος*. Paul's statement is that Christ was designated as Son of God in a powerful, impressive, efficient manner by his resurrection from the dead as a work of divine power. Compare 2 Cor. 13:4; Eph. 1:19.

Moreover, I am unable to see how equality with God can be conferred or superinduced. Equality with God can belong only to essence.

As to the antithesis of the two Adams, it seems forced, at best; but *is* there any antithesis? According to the narrative in Genesis, chap. 3, Satan declared that the eating of the fruit would confer a knowledge which would make the eaters as gods, knowing good and evil; and the woman saw that the tree was to be desired to make one wise. Nothing is said of a desire to be equal with God in the absolute sense. The temptation and the desire turned upon forbidden knowledge. The words "as gods" are defined and limited by the words "knowing good and evil;" and Scripture nowhere asserts or hints that Adam desired equality with God. Moreover, if Adam had proved obedient, his reward would not have been equality with God.

Yet something was obtained by Christ, as the result of his incarnation and of his perfect obedience therein, which he did not possess before his incarnation, and which he could not have possessed without it. Equality with God was his birthright; but his Messianic lordship was something which could accrue to him only through his incarnation and its attendant humiliation; and it was this, and not equality with God, which he received in his exaltation. The $\delta\delta\omega$ of vs. 9 is not to be taken as if God bestowed exaltation as a reward for perfect obedience, but rather, as Meyer correctly says, "as the accession of the corresponding consequence." The sequence is logical rather than ethical. Out of the human life, death, and resurrection of Christ comes a type of sovereignty which could pertain to him only through his triumph over human sin (Heb. 1:3); through his identification with men as their brother. Messianic lordship is a matter of function, not of inherent power and majesty. The phrase "seated at the right hand of God" is Messianic, and expresses Christ's Messianic triumph; but not to the detriment of any essential dignity possessed before his incarnation. But the incarnation places him, in a new sense, in actual, kingly relation to the collective life of the universe. There cannot be the bowing of every knee and the confession of every tongue so long as Christ merely remains being in the form of God—until he has made purification of sins, redeemed creation, and been manifested to earth, heaven, and hades as the Savior of men, and Lord because Savior.

Thus new elements enter into the life and sovereignty of the exalted Christ. He exists no less as Son of God, but now also as son of man, which he could be only through being born of woman and made in the likeness of men. The divine glory shines through the bodily form which he carried into heaven with him, yet "in him dwelleth all the

fulness of the godhead bodily-wise" (Col. 2:9). He is what he was not, and could not be, before his incarnation—the Great High Priest. Having begun the high-priestly work in his death and sacrifice, he now carries it on in the heavenly places by his work of intervention (*ἐντυγχάνειν*, Heb. 7:25) in the lives of those who believe on him. He is the minister of the resurrection-life to his redeemed, ever bringing to bear on them, through the Spirit, the divine forces which cause them to "walk in the newness of life." Thus lordship won by conquest in incarnation is distinguished from inherent lordship. This is the lordship which Jesus preferred to that which was inherent in him as the equal of God.

And in this fact lies the answer to the much-discussed question: What is the name which God gave him at his exaltation? As the lordship is Messianic, as the Messianic lordship comes only through the human experience and victory, the name will unite the human experience and the Messianic dominion: "Jesus," the human name; "Christ," the Messianic name. Not "Lord," for lordship was his inherent prerogative before incarnation. Not "Jesus" alone, for that represents only the human experience of humiliation; but JESUS CHRIST—Christ the Messiah only as he was "Jesus." Accordingly, "Lord," in vs. 11, is defined by Jesus Christ.

MARVIN R. VINCENT.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
New York, N. Y.

THE NEWBERRY GOSPELS.

WHEN Professor Caspar René Gregory was lecturing at the University of Chicago in 1895, he directed my attention to a Greek manuscript of the gospels, in the Newberry Library of Chicago, and suggested that it be collated. The results of the work undertaken upon this suggestion are here presented.

The manuscript is a parchment codex, of 211 leaves, carefully written in a graceful minuscule. It has generally been assigned, on palæographical grounds, to the twelfth century.¹ The parchment is

¹ The hand of the manuscript bears a closer resemblance to that of a thirteenth-century gospels in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, than to any other with which I have been able to compare it. This manuscript, Gregory's 293, Bib. Nat. Grec 117, a facsimile of which has been published by OMONT, *Fac-similés des manuscrits grecs datés de la Bibliothèque Nationale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1891, pl. LVI, is dated 1262 A. D.